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An alternative empirical approach
Abstract
This paper proposes a “before-and-after” approach to empirical examination of the rela-
tionship between democracy and growth. Rather than the commonly used cross-country
regression method, this paper compares the economic performances of forty countries be-
fore and after they became democracies or semi-democracies sometime within the last
forty years. The empirical evidence indicates that an improvement in growth performance
typically follows the transformation to democracy. Moreover, growth under democracy
appears to be more stable than under authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, wealthy countries
often experience declines in growth after a democratic transformation, while very poor
nations typically experience accelerations in growth. Growth change appears to be nega-
tively related to the initial savings ratio and positively related to the export ratio to GDP.
Partial correlation between growth change and primary school or secondary school enroll-
ments and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP is not identified.




* Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland, PO Box 160, FIN-00101 Helsinki. E-
mail: jian-guang.shen@bof.fi. I thank participants at the BOFIT seminar for their valuable




An alternative empirical approach
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa selvitetään taloudellisen kasvun ja demokratisoitumisen yhteyttä  v e r -
taamalla taloudellista kasvua 40 maassa ennen ja jälkeen poliittisen systeemin demokrati-
soitumisen. Tuloksena on, että demokratisoituminen keskimäärin kiihdyttää taloudellista
kasvua. Lisäksi kasvu on tasaisempaa demokratioissa. On kuitenkin huomattava, että rik-
kaissa maissa demokratisoitumiseen näyttää liittyvän kasvun hidastuminen, kun taas köy-
hemmissä maissa kasvu kiihtyy demokratisoitumisen jälkeen. Muutos kasvunopeudessa
korreloi negatiivisesti säästämisasteen kanssa. Korrelaatio viennin BKT-osuuden kanssa on
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1  Introduction
Democracy as a national political system gained wide acceptance in the past half century
as the percentage of the world population living under elected governments with universal
suffrage rose from 31% to 58.3%.
1 Between 1980 and 2000, 81 countries took significant
steps toward democracy.
Despite this impressive progress, some 60 countries are still ruled by authoritarian re-
gimes. Moreover, numerous newly democratized nations reverted to authoritarian regimes.
Others have seen their progress toward democracy stall in a limbo of semi-democracy.
Democratic structures benefit countries in numerous ways. They promote rule of law,
open society, freedom of choice, and stable politics, which discouraging corruption and
extremist policies. Democratic nations, according to a 2002 UN report, are also better at
managing conflicts, avoiding catastrophes, and dealing with major public health crises.
With few exceptions, developed nations are also democratic states.
An unresolved issue is whether democracy promotes economic growth better than
other systems. For the developing world, this question is critical as economic growth is
typically portrayed as the path to prosperity. Yet, if democracy fails to deliver higher eco-
nomic growth than authoritarian regimes, the implicit short-term policy goal for poor de-
veloping countries is that they should concentrate on activities that promote economic
growth until they achieve a degree of affluence.
This fundamental issue has serious implications for developing nations with authori-
tarian regimes. For example, China has achieved high economic growth under an authori-
tarian regime. Many argue that China has reached the stage where it can initiate political
reforms and should transition to a more democratic regime to sustain high growth over the
long term. Others counter that, although one-party rule has major disadvantages, it is
doubtful China has yet made sufficient gains to sustain high growth without one-party rule.
Indeed, they note, the very stability provided by one-party rule is what has made China’s
spectacular growth possible. Moreover, other Asian economies such as Taiwan and South
Korea achieved democracy only recently after decades of high economic growth under
authoritarian regimes. Thus, a clearer understanding of the relationship between democracy
and economic growth may help shed light on this issue.
Both the theoretical and empirical literature is highly divided on the effects of democ-
racy on economic growth. Regarding theory,
2 Clague et al. (1996) and Haggard (1997)
argue that democracy promotes economic growth better than authoritarian regimes. Rao
(1984), Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) disagree. Olson
(1982) actually reverses himself and joins the proponents (Olson 1993). On the empirical
front, Brunetti’s 1997 survey of nineteen empirical studies only found one study that iden-
tified a solid positive relation between democracy and growth.  For the rest, one saw a
negative relation, three found a fragile positive relation, four noted a fragile negative rela-
tion, and nine were indecisive on the relationship. All papers used a cross-country regres-
sion approach, which unfortunately for our purposes, lacks robustness of model specifica-
tion, and has trouble overcoming collinearity of explanatory variables, simultaneity bias,
parameter heterogeneity and possible non-linearity of the growth model. It is also hard to
control for institutional elements (e.g. culture and religion) in different countries.
We therefore propose a “before-and-after” approach to examine the relationship be-
tween economic growth and democratic transformation. The paper uses a group of coun-
                                                
1 The Freedom House (2002.)
2 See the earlier survey of Przeworski and Limongi (1993).Jian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
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tries that transformed themselves from authoritarian regimes to totally or partially free de-
mocracies during the past forty years. The average GNP per capita growth of the ten-year
period prior to democracy is compared with the average growth rate in the first ten years
under a democratic regime. The change in growth performance after the transformation to
democracy is then examined in terms of income, inequality, investment ratio, education
levels, and several other factors.
The advantage of this method is its simplicity. It allows us to circumvent many of the
drawbacks of cross-country regression extensively discussed in the literature. The selection
of our samples is based exclusively on the regime change from authoritarian rule to a
democratic regime. In addition, unlike cross-countries regression studies that use a unified
time period for all countries, we simply take the starting year of democracy as the dividing
line to examine growth performance under pre-democratic and democratic regimes. Thus,
we obviate the need to control for an individual country’s institutional factors as the county
is compared only to itself. This approach also gives the possibility to test for impacts of
various institutional factors on growth performance.
Most Eastern European countries became democracies quite recently following the
end of the Cold War. If only for the sake of fairness, they should be included in our sam-
ple. Unfortunately, we must exclude the Eastern European bloc for two reasons. First, their
economic statistics, and particularly GNP per capita growth prior to 1990, are nonexistent
or highly dubious. This makes it difficult to compare growth performance before and after
transformation. Second, most of these nations experienced severe disruptions in economic
activity for several years in the early phases of transition. During early transition from a
centrally planned to a market-oriented economy factors such as re-orientation of external
trade play a much more substantial role in GNP development than democracy.
The results of our “before-and-after” method indicate that a change in political regime
influences economic growth. The ten-year average growth rate for some 40 countries is
higher by a half percentage point after their democratic transformations. The five-year av-
erage growth rate is higher by a full percentage point. Over 60% of the sample countries
witnessed accelerations in growth after they adopted democracy. Countries in our sample
also generally experienced a deterioration of growth performance before they shifted to
democracy. This may support the view that a deterioration of economic conditions can
propel the transformation to democracy. In any case, growth under democracy is much
more stable than under authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, wealthy nations often see a
decline in growth after democratic transformation, while very poor countries generally
experience accelerations in growth.
There are other factors, of course, that could explain the difference in growth per-
formance across countries after democratic transformation. We identify several here:
growth performance is negatively related to the initial savings ratio and positively related
to the export ratio to GDP. There are no partial correlation relations between growth
change and primary school or secondary school enrollments, or the ratio of government
expenditure to GDP.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002
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2  Literature survey, existing methodology and
 related  problems
In the theoretical literature, Olson (1993) argues that democracy better guarantees property
and contract rights because autocratic regimes are unable to commit credibly to such
rights.
3 Clague et al. (1996) extend this view, noting that because democracy better pro-
tects property rights, it provides greater incentives for investment. Haggard (1997) posits
that democracy may better manage and consolidate economic reform than an authoritarian
regime.
 In some studies, democracy was seen as a potential risk to growth because it was
open to pressures from interest groups, e.g. Olson (1982). Rao (1984) further argues
authoritarian regimes orchestrate economic growth by sacrificing current consumption for
investment, which makes them rather effective at mobilizing savings. Persson and Tabel-
lini (1992) observe democracies may attempt to reduce material inequality through growth-
deterring redistributive taxation. This school of thought has reemerged recently with novel
arguments as to why authoritarian regimes are better at promoting economic growth than
democracies. Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) compare fiscal federalism in China and Russia
to demonstrate that political centralization in China reduces both the risk of capture and the
scope of competition for rents by local governments. In contrast, the emergence of a partly
dysfunctional democracy in transitional Russia deters economic growth due to rampant
local capture and competition for rents.
On the empirical front, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Barro (1991) established
cross-country regression on growth by democracy controlling for a number of standard
additional variables as a standard procedure.
4 Surveys including Sirowy and Inkeles
(1990), Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995) and Brunetti (1997) conclude that the relation-
ship between democracy and growth is ambiguous. Among these studies, only a few find a
significant unambiguous relationship between growth and democracy (and these only un-
der particular specifications subject to arbitrary selection of data sets). Most recent studies,
e.g. Barro and Lee (1993), Helliwell (1994), de Haan and Siermann (1995), Levin and
Renelt (1992), Alesina et al (1996) and World Bank (1990) find no relationship between
growth and democracy. Barro (1996) tests for a non-liner relationship between democracy
and growth. He finds that the relationship overall is ambiguous; more democracy is condu-
cive to growth at low levels of democracy, but harmful at high levels of democracy.
The typical cross-country regression uses average GDP per capita growth in a certain
period of time regressed on a certain measurement of degree of democracy and controlling
for a set of other determinants of economic growth. The degree of democracy is often a
yearly average or in a certain year. This methodology neglects regime change and is highly
dependent on controlling variables.
                                                
3 North (1990) makes a forceful argument that secure property rights are critical for growth.
4 Empirical testing for a relationship between democracy and growth has evolved along two lines.
The first approach, pioneered by Lipset (1959), examines the relationship between the level of
development and democracy. The second tests for a relationship between growth rate and
democracy using the cross-country regression method. Most recent studies belong to this type, e.g.
Barro (1991, 1996). Recent development focuses on the regression of growth on change of
democratic level, e.g. Minier (1998) and political regime change, e.g. Alesina et al (1996) and
Durham (1999).Jian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
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A typical regression takes the following form:
ε γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + = L L L    (1)
where gi is the growth rate of a certain country, vector Xi is the set of additional explana-
tory variables for economic growth such as initial GDP per capita, investment, and  educa-
tion. A more extensive set of X also includes fertility rate, government spending, black-
market premium on foreign exchange, and change in terms of trade.
5 Di is the democratic
		 	
			
Empirical studies on the relationship between democracy and growth reflect the
problems of gross-country empirical studies on economic growth in general. Brock and
Durlauf (2001) detail the complexity of these problems.
6 Here we focus on the empirical
work on the relationship between growth and democracy, but refer to general cases when
appropriate.
Empirical studies must overcome the lack of robustness of specification, as well as
problems related to collinearity, simultaneity bias, parameter heterogeneity and non-
linearity of growth model. We address each drawback in turn.
First, there is a lack of consistency in specification of controlling variables. About 50
specifications and over 90 variables may be statistically significant to economic growth.
Researchers subjectively select what seems reasonable in the context of their work. Their
choice of controlling variables, however, may have significant effects on the result. In
other words, we are essentially dealing with a robustness problem and the need for sensi-
tivity analyses. Levine and Renelt (1992) show that most explanatory variables in cross-
country regressions hinge on particular specifications; they do not survive if the set of ad-
ditional variables is altered. They propose that a formal sensitivity test of explanatory vari-
ables should be included in this type of regression by systematically varying the set of
variables. Formal sensitivity tests have not been done in most empirical growth regres-
sions, although there are exceptions, e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1996).
Second, controlling variables are sometimes correlated with explanatory variables.
This is a typical multi-collinearity problem. Democracy could have an impact on rule of
law, markets and human capital. The benefits of democracy on growth depend mainly on
democracy’s impacts on these variables. If any of these variables are used as controlling
variables, the multi-collinearity problem occurs. In a well-noted study, Barro (1996) states,
“The favourable effects on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free mar-
ket, small government consumption and high human capital. Once these kinds of variables
and initial levels of real per capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy
on growth is weakly negative.”
Third, when growth is regressed on democracy, causal interpretations presuppose that
democracy is exogenous to the development level or economic growth. This flies in the
face of well-documented theories, e.g. Lipset (1959) Rustow (1970), Huntingon (1991) and
Barro (1997). As Przeworski and Limongi (1993) point out “if democracies and authori-
tarian regimes have a different chance of survival under various economic conditions, the
regimes are endogenously selected.”
                                                
5 For more, see Barro (1996).
6 The problems of cross-country regression studies on democracy and growth resemble closely
those on trade policy and growth. See Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and Srinivasan (2001).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002
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Minier (1998) argues that the level of development affects democracy, while economic
growth does not. Here, there is no causality problem since the growth rate is regressed.
Unfortunately, this argument is unconvincing as a deteriorating economy (i.e. declining
growth rate) may very well trigger a change in the political regime. As we will see below,
a transition from authoritarian regime to democracy is often preceded by a substantial de-
cline in economic growth.
In a larger context, this is basically an issue of simultaneity. OLS regressions do not
reveal the direction of causality, so we consider the use of exogenous variables as instru-
ments. Finding a suitable instrument is not easy, as it should not be auto-correlated to eco-
nomic growth. Frankel and Romer (1996) use area as an instrument in cross-country re-
gression on growth.
7 Another way to handle this problem is to estimate simultaneous
equations as in Helliwell (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996).
Fourth, conventional growth regression studies assume that parameters that describe
growth are identical across countries. Normally, an augmented Solow growth framework,
with fixed parameters for both rich and poor countries, is used. As pointed out by Brock
and Durlauf (2001), a problem of parameter heterogeneity arises in such cases. They fur-
ther claim that the assumption of a single linear growth model that applies to all countries
is incorrect.
Fifth, as Barro (1996) demonstrates, the relationship between democracy and growth
may be non-linear. When a country’s democracy indicator (Freedom House index) changes
from 3 to 1 (both indicate a free democracy), the impacts on economic growth may be dif-
ferent from that of a change of democracy indicator in another country, say, from 6 to 4,
which means a country has transformed from a not free regime to a partly free democracy.
Using linear models may produce biased indicators.
Sixth, empirical studies often rely on comparison with “prior similar countries.” For
example, a recent study, Minier (1998), examines the growth experience of countries that























The criterion for choosing “prior similar countries” or “comparable countries” is the
similar level of GDP per capita and democracy. Since “prior similar countries” have to
maintain sufficiently small change in democratic level, the number of “prior similar coun-
tries” is small. In addition, the sole use of per capita GDP as a criterion is an overly narrow
definition for “prior similar countries.” Other factors, such as economic structure, trade
dependency, geographic location, population, ethnical composition and cultural and his-
torical heritages, may also play important roles.
Seventh, most empirical studies ignore the obvious possibility that the democratic
level of a country may change over time. As de Haan and Siermann (1995) observe,
This implies that focusing on period averages of the Gastil rankings, as most authors
do, may yield biased estimates, since basically the same problems remains as with point
estimates. For the characterization of a regime it makes quite a difference whether a coun-
try has a constant ranking over a number of years, say a ranking of 2, or weather its posi-
tion varies greatly ending up with the same average ranking of 2.
These problems are not only fairly intractable, but the proposed solutions are also un-
satisfactory. We therefore propose a “before-and-after” method to look at the unique stage
of political development that transforms the regime from authoritarian to democracy and
examine the relationship between democracy and economic growth by comparing individ-
                                                
7 This instrument, however, is controversial and is criticized by Brock and Durlauf (2001).Jian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
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ual country’s growth performance under authoritarian and democratic regimes.  This may
help answer the question of whether democratic transformation are better at promoting
economic growth than authoritarian regimes, and if so, under what conditions (e.g. initial
income level). We consider countries that transformed themselves from authoritarian re-
gimes to totally or partially free democracies within the last thirty years. The average eco-
nomic growth rate of five to ten years prior to democracy is compared with the average
growth rate during the first five or ten years under democracy.
Our method is based on a conviction that a regime change (in this case, the transfor-
mation from an authoritarian regime to a democracy) impacts many aspects of economic
relations. Growth performance before and after transformation thus needs to be analyzed
separately. We attempt to discern whether the change in growth performance after the
transformation to democracy is explained by factors that include initial income level, ine-
quality, investment ratio, and education levels. The method applies regression as follows
ε β α + ⋅ + = ∆ L L   .( 2 )
The advantages of this method are its simplicity and the possibility to circumvent some of
the drawbacks of cross-countries regression discussed earlier. The selection of the sample
is based exclusively on change from authoritarian rule to a democratic regime. The year of
transformation when regime change occurred is used as the dividing point for examining
growth performance in two regimes. By looking only at the same country at different
times, we eliminate the need to identify many otherwise indispensable control variables.
Moreover, there are no problems of simultaneity bias or collinearity − and no definitional
problems such as “prior similar countries.” The aggregate of all these countries mitigates
shocks to individual countries. Moreover, for each individual country, the time span under
study is different, which partially mitigates the trend of growth over time.
3  The empirical test
3.1  The data set
To select which countries have transformed from authoritarian regime to democracy, we
use Freedom House’s annual survey of country scores as a selection standard. Freedom







































                                                
8 The Freedom House index for democracy is not entirely satisfactory as it is highly subjective and
places an overly high emphasis on political systems. Its long historical data and comprehensiveness
probably explain its popularity among researchers.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002
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Table 1.  Change in growth performance
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Argentina L 1984 -0.7 1.5 2.2 -2.7 -0.6 2.1
Bangladesh* A 1992 2.5 3.4 0.9 2.6 3.2 0.6
Benin* AF 1992 -0.6 1.9 2.5 -2.3 1.4 3.7
Bolivia L 1983 1.0 -0.5 -1.5 -1.5 -2.0 -0.5
Brazil L 1975 5.6 0.9 -4.8 8.7 3.0 -5.7
Cape Verde* AF 1992 .. .. .. 1.9 2.9 1.0
Central Africa* AF 1994 -2.5 1.6 4.1 -3.3 1.5 4.8
Chile L 1990 1.4 5.4 4.0 5.2 5.6 0.4
Ecuador L 1980 5.6 -0.5 -6.1 4.3 -1.5 -5.8
Ghana* AF 1996 1.4 1.7 0.3 1.3 1.7 0.4
Greece E 1975 7.2 2.1 -5.1 7.8 3.9 -3.9
Grenada L 1986 3.4 3.3 -0.1 2.3 5.7 3.4
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Honduras L 1981 2.3 -0.8 -3.1 3.3 -1.2 -4.5
Jordan* A 1992 -2.3 2.9 5.2 -5.2 4.6 9.8
Lesotho* AF 1994 0.6 -0.9 -1.5 0.9 -0.4 -1.3
Madagascar* AF 1991 -3.0 -1.0 1.9 -0.9 -3.0 -2.0
Malawi* AF 1995 0.6 4.4 3.8 1.3 4.4 3.2
Mali* AF 1993 -1.0 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.2
Mexico L 1974 3.8 1.9 -1.9 3.0 2.4 -0.6
Morocco AF 1978 3.8 0.8 -3.0 3.4 1.1 -2.4
Mozambique* AF 1995 0.6 6.5 5.8 0.5 6.5 5.9
Nepal A 1981 0.2 2.1 1.9 0.7 2.2 1.5
Nicaragua* L 1991 -4.6 2.0 6.6 -7.2 -1.0 6.2
Pakistan A 1986 2.4 3.3 0.9 3.1 4.0 0.9
Panama* L 1991 -1.7 2.7 4.3 -2.6 3.8 6.3
Paraguay L 1990 1.4 -0.6 -2.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Peru L 1981 0.8 -2.3 -3.0 -1.4 -2.1 -0.7
Philippines A 1985 2.2 0.6 -1.6 1.2 0.9 -0.3
Portugal E 1977 5.5 1.7 -3.7 4.4 2.3 -2.1
Senegal AF 1979 -0.7 0.4 1.1 -0.6 1.0 1.6
Singapore A 1982 6.9 5.4 -1.5 6.2 4.5 -1.7
South Africa* AF 1995 -1.1 0.3 1.4 -1.7 0.3 2.0
Korea. Rep. A 1986 5.8 7.9 2.1 4.4 9.4 5.0
Spain E 1978 4.3 1.3 -3.0 4.0 0.0 -4.0
Suriname AF 1988 -1.6 1.5 3.1 -6.4 2.4 8.8
Thailand A 1980 4.4 5.3 0.9 4.9 3.4 -1.5
Turkey A 1983 1.5 2.9 1.4 -0.8 4.1 4.8
Uruguay L 1986 -0.2 3.6 3.8 -4.6 3.6 8.2
Zimbabwe AF 1980 1.9 1.6 -0.3 -3.7 1.3 5.0
Average* 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.7 2.0 1.3
* Countries with less than a decade of democracy. Their average growth under democracy is calculated,
instead of the ten-year average. For geographic location, A stands for Asia, AF Africa, E Europe and L Latin
America. Outliers Guinea-Bissau and Guyana are excluded from the overall average for reasons discussed
below.Jian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
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The Freedom House Survey employs two series of checklists, one for questions regarding
political rights and one for civil liberties, and assigns each country or territory considered a
numerical rating for each category on a scale of 1 to 7. The political rights and civil liber-
ties ratings are then averaged and used to assign each country to an overall freedom value.
Those with ratings averaging 1-2.5 are generally considered “Free,” while 3-5.5 is “Partly
Free,” and 5.5-7 “Not Free.” The dividing line between “Partly Free” and “Not Free” is
5.5. For our purposes, any time a country’s Freedom House score falls from above 5.5 to
under 4.5, and remains below 4.5 for the next five or ten years, the country is selected as an
example. For almost all the examples, the scores consistently decline after the years after
the democratic shift. Some countries experienced this transformation recently in the 1990s,
so only a five-year period of growth performance is possible. Nigeria, and a few other, had
scores that dipped below 5 in the 1980s then went up again. Such performances are ex-
cluded. Valid sample countries must sustain a democratic regime at least five years so that
their economic growth before and after democratic transformation can be compared (see
Appendix).
We take our real GNP per capita growth figures from the World Bank’s Development
Indicators 2002. The average five- and ten-year growth rates before and after democratic
transformation are calculated. The World Bank does not include data for Taiwan, so we
exclude it even though the country is an otherwise suitable example of democratic trans-
formation
The starting year of democracy for each country is quite important. The starting year
chosen is the first full calendar year under stable democracy. The ten-year average growth
rate for the country thus includes the starting year’s growth. When calculating the 10-year
average growth rate prior to transformation, the year immediately before the starting year
of democracy is not included, because this year is most vulnerable to the immediate impact
of regime change. Even when the changeover year is included in the calculations, however,
the results are virtually the same. We present the results that exclude the year immediately
before the starting year of democracy.
3.2  Empirical tests and results
Two conclusions can be drawn directly from Table 1. First, the change of regimes seems to
influence economic growth in general. The ten-year average growth rate is higher by a half
percentage point after the democratic transformation. Around two-thirds of the sample
countries witnessed a pick-up in growth. If five-year average growth is compared, the dif-
ference is larger than a full percentage point. Thus, on average, there is an improvement in
growth performance after the democratic transformation.
During the ten-year period prior to the democratic transformation, the yearly growth
rate trends downward, deteriorating on average to its lowest level two years before the de-
mocratic transformation. This supports the view that deterioration of economic conditions
may actually impel the transformation to democracy. Once the sample countries achieve
democracy, growth initially picks up strongly in most cases then gradually decelerates to
the twenty-year average. Growth under democracy is generally much more stable than un-
der authoritarian regimes. The standard deviation of average growth before democratic
transformation is 1.2, but only 0.2 after. The average of individual country’s standard de-
viation of growth is 3.8 after becoming democracy compared with 4.4 under authoritarian
regimes. In addition, the average growth rate before the transformation trended down-Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002
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wards, declining by 0.25 percentage points per year, while during the first ten years of de-
mocracy, average growth rate is rather stable.
Figure 1 Growth performance before and after democracy transformation, 20-year period
Examining the growth performance of individual countries, we find most conform to pat-
tern described above. Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Honduras, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and
Thailand are the exceptions. They suffered a drastic decline in growth after becoming de-
mocracies. Others, including Bolivia, Lesotho, Mexico, Philippine and Singapore experi-
enced modest declines in economic growth after their democratic transformations. Notably,
these countries were already relatively wealthy when they adopted democracy. It is proba-
bly not the deterioration in economic conditions, but emerging middle classes that drove
the democratic transformation in these countries.
Figure 2 Growth performance before and after democracy transformation for eight countries
Greece, Portugal and Spain, which all enjoyed robust growth under authoritarian regimes,
suffered significant declines in economic growth when they adopted democracy. In all
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when long-ruling dictators were overthrown. In Asia and Latin America, the outcomes of
democratic transformations are mixed; some countries experienced higher growth, others
didn’t. Most African countries witnessed a pickup in growth after democratic transforma-
tion. Democracy swept most of Africa in the early 1990s, so the post-authoritarian experi-
ences are relatively short. Many countries have been under democratic regimes for less
than ten years, so we must assess them for shorter periods of growth performance.
In terms of regime change, the three European countries experienced the most dra-
matic change, with their freedom index values falling from above 5.5 (Not Free) to below
2.5 (Free) immediately after transformation. Most countries’ freedom index values were in
the range of 2-4.5 (Partly Free to Free) for a long period after above 5.5 (Not Free). Thus,
the impact of democratic transformation on growth coincides with geographic locale. Out-
side Europe, the correlation between the degree of democratic change and growth is weak.
One might argue that poor countries benefit economically by switching to democracy,
while wealthy countries gain little in terms of economic growth. We can test this claim by
regressing the change in growth for each country on their initial income per capita in the
starting year of democracy. Guinea-Bissau and Guyana are excluded, as these two are the
outliers. In 1998, Guinea-Bissau’s GNP per capital declined by 30% due to a war. Guy-
ana’s change in growth rate of GNP per capita after democratic transformation exceeded
17%. Guyana is a very poor country, which reinforces the negative relation between
growth change and initial income. Including Guyana does not change the result. We pres-
ent results in Table 2 below as a scatter plot with a regression line.
Table 2.  Regression of growth change on initial income
Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value              t-prob.  Part.R²
Constant               7.69528       2.681      2.87      0.007    0.1782
LOG (Initial Income)  -2.32861      0.8591     -2.71      0.010    0.1620
sigma                 2.89119   RSS                317.641861
R² 0.162005   F(1,38) =        7.346 [0.010]*
log-likelihood        -98.1984   DW                       2.28
no. of observations        40   no. of parameters            2
mean(Growth Change)   0.535227   var(Growth Change)            9.47624
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The relation is negative. The coefficient of initial income to growth change is significant at
the 1% level. Thus, rich countries often saw a decline in growth after democratic transfor-
mation, while very poor countries typically experienced accelerations in growth. With re-
gard to the debate in China, the empirical evidence does not support the claim that poor
countries should wait until the economy reaches certain degree of affluence before engag-
ing in democratic transformation. According to the empirical test, China might be able to
achieve an acceleration of growth by 1 percentage point in the next ten years, given a cur-
rent per capita GDP of $1,000.
There are several other factors that may explain the difference in performance across
countries, including the initial savings ratio, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP,
the fertility rate, and income inequality. Because data is available, we examine the savings
ratio, export ratio to GDP, ratio of government expenditure, and education.
We try the regression of the growth change on initial saving ratio, get a negative relation-
ship, and the result is highly significant.
9
Table 3. Regression of growth change on savings ratio
Coefficient   Std. Error   t-value   t-prob  Part.R²
Constant              2.41846      0.6944      3.48    0.001    0.2420
Savings ratio      -0.133302    0.03831     -3.48    0.001              0.2416
sigma                 2.75049   RSS                287.477154
R²                    0.241584   F(1,38) =      12.1 [0.001]**
log-likelihood       -96.2028   DW                       2.13
no. of observations        40   no. of parameters           2
mean(Growth change) 0.535227 var(Growth change)      9.47624
                                                
9 Lesotho, with a savings rate of -36%, is an outlier. It is excluded from the regression.
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The test for the impact of export ratio to GDP on growth change yielded a positive relation
between the two. The coefficient becomes significant at 10% after initial income is con-
trolled. The partial relation between primary school and secondary school enrollments, the
ratio of government expenditure to GDP, and growth change, is not significant.
Table 4.       Regression of growth difference by OLS
                       Coefficient    Std. error   t-value    t-prob  Part.R²
Constant              6.18883      2.856      2.17        0.037    0.1154
Export ratio        0.0753177    0.04150    1.81       0.078    0.0838
Income               -2.39691       0.8815    -2.72       0.010    0.1704
sigma                 2.82861   RSS                288.036365
R²           0.224942   F(2,36) =      5.224 [0.010]*
log-likelihood       -94.3293   DW                       2.03
No. of observations        39   No. of parameters           3
mean(Growth difference)     0.551265  Var(Growth difference)      9.52903
Alesina and Rodrick (1991) argue that democracies with initially unequal distributions of
income will have lower growth than democracies with more even distributions of income
for the reason that the large group of enfranchised poor in the first case will vote for a high
tax on capital, which will deter investment. Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Alesina and
Perotti (1996) give evidences to show that inequality is harmful for growth. To test this
hypothesis, we regress the change in growth rate on initial inequality in the year of demo-
cratic transformation. Since inequality indicators are not available for many countries, we
use the same method as Alesina and Perotti (1996), who use differences in male and fe-
male primary enrollment rates as an indicator for inequality across countries. The empirical
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test fails to find a partial correlation relation between this enrollment difference and growth
change.
Thus, the difference in growth performance may be accounted for by initial income,
savings ratio and the openness of economies at the beginning of transition to democracy.
Using multiple regression, i.e.
ε δ γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ∆ L L L L 
	 %&
	 ' ()**  _ ) log( (3)
we get the results shown in Table 5.
Table 5.  Regression of growth difference by OLS
                       Coefficient      Std. error   t-value t-prob     Part.R²
Constant         3.14923       3.222     0.978    0.335      0.0273
log(GNPPC)  -0.729326       1.174    -0.621    0.538      0.0112
Savings ratio   -0.136693     0.05969     -2.29    0.028      0.1336
Export ratio      0.0606830     0.04045      1.50    0.143      0.0621
sigma               2.68381   RSS              244.89566
R² 0.336485   F(3,34) =      5.747 [0.003]**
log-likelihood       -89.3213   DW                  1.98
No. of observations        38   No. of parameters            4
mean(Growth difference)     0.509835   Var(Growth difference)   9.71285
By controlling for the initial income, savings negatively affect growth performance, while
openness has a positive impact on growth performance after democratic transformation.
Barro (1996) suggests that the relationship between growth and democracy may be
nonlinear, as more democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom, but de-
presses growth when a moderate level of freedom has been attained. Here, we test for this
with following regression
ε δ γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + = ∆ L L L L  ' #+  4)
where ∆FI is the change in the Freedom House index in the first year in democracy, D is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when the regime change ends up with full freedom (Freedom
House index below 3) and 0 when partial freedom is achieved (Freedom House index
above 3).Jian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
20
 Table 6.  Regression on Growth Difference by OLS
                     Coefficient   Std. error   t-value   t-prob  Part.R²
Constant       2.45953       1.235      1.99    0.054    0.1017
Savings       -0.147097     0.03973     -3.70    0.001    0.2814
∆FI             0.212225      0.5118     0.415    0.681    0.0049
D                 -1.35705      1.268     -1.07    0.292    0.0317
sigma                 2.73149   RSS                261.136314
R²                  0.299982   F(3,35) =         5 [0.005]**
log-likelihood       -92.4175   DW                  2.2
No. of observations        39   No. of parameters       4
mean(growth difference)     0.458181   var(growth difference)      9.56519
The results show that when the initial savings ratio is controlled, large improvements in the
democratic environment are beneficial to growth. However, if countries become “too free”
immediately after democratic transformation, growth performance is likely to suffer.
Countries that experience large improvements in democratic institutions while retaining
some curbs on freedom can expect higher growth.
4  Conclusions and discussion
This paper applied a simple “before-and after” method to test the relationship of democ-
racy and economic growth. Using a sample of forty countries, we found that, on average,
there was an improvement in growth performance after the transformation democracy.
Moreover, in the period just before the switch to democracy, most countries experienced
deteriorations in growth performance. This supports the view that deteriorations in eco-
nomic condition may propel the transformation to democracy. In any case, growth under
democratic regimes tends to be far more stable than that under authoritarian regimes. Inter-
estingly, relatively rich countries often experienced a decline in growth after their demo-
cratic transformations, while very poor countries often experienced accelerations in
growth.
There are obviously many factors that may explain differences in growth performance
across countries after democratic transformation. We found that growth performance is
negatively related to the initial savings ratio and positively related to the export ratio to
GDP. There are no partial correlation relations between growth change and primary school
or secondary school enrollments, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP, or income
inequality (or, at least, its crude approximation). The initial state of these variables in the
year of transformation apparently matters little; rather, what matters is the change in these
variables after democratic transformation.
The sample countries that converted to democracy within the last forty years on aver-
age witnessed a pickup in growth. However, we did not study whether authoritarian re-
gimes were necessary doing any worse in the same time frame. It is obviously difficult to
infer the growth performance under democracy of a country that remained authoritarian.
One popular comparison is China and India. In the 1950s, China and India had comparable
income levels and populations, but quite different political regimes. India was the democ-Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002
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racy and China was an authoritarian regime. Yet China has enjoyed higher economic
growth than India, especially after 1980. During 1980-2000, China grew almost twice as
fast as India.
Other countries under authoritarian regimes have done quite badly, e.g. Iraq. As Barro
(1996) and Sah (1991) claim, an authoritarian regime is a risky investment. The autocrat
may be preoccupied with economic development, as was the case in some countries in East
Asia, while other may advance interests in conflict with growth promotion, as we have
seen in Africa.
Our findings lend support to the view that growth on average is more stable under
democracy. For those economies that experienced transformation to democracy, economic
growth under democracy has been more stable than that under their earlier authoritarian
regimes. However, this conclusion is subject to sample bias. The reason for the collapse of
authoritarian regime may well be a collapse in economic growth. Thus, it may be a two-
way causal relation, which indeed justifies simultaneous estimation methods in normal
cross-country regression analyses.
Some of the poorest countries in the sample set have histories of democracy less than
ten years old. It is not clear how long or even whether they can sustain democracy. Since
the 1990s, several former democracies have returned to authoritarian regimes. It is clear
that the collapse of authoritarian regime is preceded by decline in growth. For those with
the stomach, it may also be worthwhile to find out what prompts regime change from de-
mocracy to an authoritarian regime.Jian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
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Appendix
Annual freedom scores in sample countries, 1972 to 2001
<HDU $UJHQWLQD %DQJODGHVK %HQLQ %ROLYLD %UD]LO &DSH￿9HUGH
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,3,PF 2,4,PF 7,5,NF 5,4,PF 5,5,PF -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,2,F 4,4,PF 7,5,NF 5,4,PF 5,5,PF -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,4,PF 4,4,PF 7,6,NF 6,5,NF ￿￿￿￿3) -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,4,PF 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,5,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 7,4,PF 7,7,NF 6,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 6,4,PF 7,7,NF 6,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 4,4,PF 7,7,NF 5,3,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 3,3,PF 7,6,NF 3,3,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 3,3,PF 7,6,NF 7,5,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 3,4,PF 7,6,NF 7,5,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,PF 5,5,PF 7,6,NF ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3) 6,5,PF 7,6,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,2,F 6,5,PF 7,7,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 6,7,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,2,F 5,5,PF 7,7,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 6,7,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,1,F 4,5,PF 7,7,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 6,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,1,F 4,5,PF 7,7,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 5,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,1,F 4,5,PF 7,7,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 5,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,2,F 4,4,PF 7,7,NF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 6,5,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,3,F 5,5,PF 6,4,PF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,3,F ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿) 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 2,3,F 2,3,F 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 2,4,PF 2,3,F 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 2,4,PF 2,3,F 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 3,4,PF 2,2,F 2,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 2,4,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 2,4,PF 2,2,F 1,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,F 2,4,PF 2,2,F 1,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F 3,4,PF 2,3,F 1,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F




&KLOH (FXDGRU *KDQD *UHHFH *UHQDGD
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 1,2,F 7,3,PF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 7,5,NF 7,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,5,NF -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 7,5,NF 7,5,NF 7,5,NF ￿￿￿￿) 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 7,5,NF 7,5,NF 7,5,NF 2,2,F 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 7,5,NF 6,5,PF 7,5,NF 2,2,F 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 7,5,NF 6,5,PF 6,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 6,5,NF 5,3,PF 6,4,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,6,NF 6,5,PF ￿￿￿￿) 4,4,PF 2,2,F 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,6,NF 6,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 2,2,F 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,5,NF 6,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 1,2,F 6,5,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,5,NF 6,5,NF 2,2,F 6,5,NF 1,2,F 6,5,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,5,NF 6,5,PF 2,2,F 6,5,NF 1,2,F 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,6,NF 6,5,PF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 1,2,F 5,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,6,NF 6,5,PF 2,3,F 7,6,NF 2,2,F ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,6,NF 6,5,PF 2,3,F 7,6,NF 2,2,F 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 6,5,PF 2,3,F 7,6,NF 2,2,F 2,1,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 5,4,PF 2,2,F 6,6,NF 2,2,F 2,1,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 2,2,F 6,5,NF 1,2,F 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 2,2,F 2,2,F 6,5,NF 1,2,F 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 6,6,NF 1,2,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 5,5,PF 1,2,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3) 2,2,F 2,3,F 5,4,PF 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 5,4,PF 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,5,PF 2,2,F 2,4,PF 3,4,PF 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,5,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,2,F 2,3,F 3,3,PF 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 3,3,PF 1,3,F 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F 1,3,F 1,2,F
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F - 2,2,F 7,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,2,F - 4,2,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 4,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 6,6,NF 4,3,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 6,6,NF 4,3,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 6,6,NF 3,3,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 6,6,NF 3,3,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 6,6,NF 4,3,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,5,PF 6,6,NF 4,4,PF 6,3,PF 6,6,NF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 6,6,NF 4,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF 5,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 5,4,PF 3,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 6,6,NF 5,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,6,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3) 6,6,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF ￿￿￿￿3)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 6,7,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 6,7,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 6,7,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 6,5,NF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 6,6,NF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 6,5,NF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,5,PF 6,5,PF 5,4,PF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 6,5,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 2,3,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 6,5,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 3,4,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 4,4,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 4,5,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,5,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,2,FJian-Guang Shen Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach
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<HDU /HVRWKR 0DGDJDVFDU 0DODZL 0DOL 0H[LFR 0RURFFR
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,4,NF 5,3,PF 7,6,NF 7,6,NF 5,3,PF 5,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,3,PF 5,4,PF 7,6,NF 7,6,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 5,4,PF 7,6,NF 7,6,NF 4,3,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 5,5,PF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 4,3,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 5,5,PF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 4,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF 4,4,PF 3,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 3,4,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,6,PF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,6,PF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,6,PF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 4,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 4,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 5,5,PF 6,7,NF 7,6,NF 4,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 5,5,PF 6,7,NF 6,6,NF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 5,4,PF 7,6,NF 6,6,NF 4,3,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 7,6,NF 6,5,NF 4,4,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,4,PF 4,4,PF 7,6,NF 6,4,PF 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,4,PF 4,4,PF 6,7,NF ￿￿￿￿) 4,3,PF 6,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3) 2,4,PF 6,5,NF 2,3,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF ￿￿￿￿) 2,4,PF 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F 2,3,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F 2,2,F 4,3,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F 3,3,F 3,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F 3,3,F 3,4,PF 5,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,F 3,4,PF 5,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 3,3,PF 2,3,F 2,3,F 5,4,PF
<HDU 0R]DPELTXH 1HSDO 1LFDUDJXD 1LJHULD 3DNLVWDQ 3DQDPD
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ - 6,5,NF 4,3,PF 6,4,PF 3,5,PF 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ - 6,5,NF 5,4,PF 6,4,PF 3,5,PF 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ - 6,5,NF 5,4,PF 6,4,PF 3,5,PF 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 6,5,NF 5,4,PF 6,5,PF 5,5,PF 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 6,5,NF 5,5,PF 6,4,PF 4,5,PF 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 6,5,NF 5,5,PF 5,4,PF 6,4,PF 6,5,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 6,5,NF 5,5,PF 5,3,PF 6,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 5,4,PF 5,5,PF ￿￿￿￿) 6,6,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 5,5,PF 2,3,F 7,5,NF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 6,5,PF 2,3,F 7,5,NF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 6,5,PF 2,3,F 7,5,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7,6,NF 3,4,PF 6,5,PF 2,3,F 7,5,NF 5,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 7,5,NF 7,5,NF 4,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 7,5,NF ￿￿￿￿3) 6,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,6,PF 7,5,NF 4,5,PF 6,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 6,5,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,4,PF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 6,5,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,7,NF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,5,PF 3,3,PF 7,6,NF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 4,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 5,5,PF 4,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,4,PF 2,3,F 3,3,PF 5,4,PF 4,5,PF 4,2,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,4,PF 2,3,F 4,3,PF 5,4,PF 4,5,PF 4,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,NF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 7,5,NF 3,5,PF 3,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3) 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 7,6,NF 3,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 4,4,PF 7,7,NF 3,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 3,3,PF 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 3,3,PF 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 2,3,F 6,4,PF 4,5,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 3,3,PF 4,3,PF 7,5,NF 1,2,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,4,PF 3,4,PF 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 6,5,NF 1,2,FBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002
25
<HDU 3DUDJXD\ 3HUX 3KLOLSSLQHV 3RUWXJDO 6HQHJDO 6LQJDSRUH
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,6,PF 7,5,NF 4,6,PF 5,6,NF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 7,5,NF 5,5,PF 5,6,NF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 5,5,PF 5,3,PF 6,5,NF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 6,4,PF 5,5,PF 5,3,PF 6,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,NF 6,4,PF 5,5,PF ￿￿￿￿) 6,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,NF 6,4,PF 5,5,PF 2,2,F 5,3,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,4,PF 5,5,PF 2,2,F ￿￿￿￿3) 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 5,4,PF 5,5,PF 2,2,F 4,3,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF ￿￿￿￿) 5,5,PF 2,2,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 2,2,F 4,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,4,PF 1,2,F 4,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 1,2,F 4,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 2,3,F ￿￿￿￿3) 1,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,5,PF 2,3,F 4,3,PF 1,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 2,3,F 4,2,PF 1,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 2,3,F 2,2,F 1,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,6,NF 2,3,F 2,3,F 1,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3) 2,4,PF 2,3,F 1,2,F 4,3,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 3,4,PF 3,3,PF 1,2,F 4,3,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 3,5,PF 3,3,PF 1,1,F 4,3,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 6,5,PF 3,3,PF 1,1,F 4,3,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3,3,PF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 1,1,F 4,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 5,4,PF 3,4,PF 1,1,F 4,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 5,4,PF 2,4,PF 1,1,F 4,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 4,3,PF 2,3,F 1,1,F 4,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 1,1,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 1,1,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 1,1,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,3,PF 3,3,PF 2,3,F 1,1,F 3,4,PF 5,5,PF
<HDU 6RXWK￿$IULFD 6SDLQ 6XULQDPH 7DLZDQ 7KDLODQG 7XUNH\￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2,3,F (5,6,NF) 5,6,NF - 6,5,NF 7,5,NF 3,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 5,6,NF - 6,5,NF 6,3,PF 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 5,5,PF - 6,5,NF 5,3,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 2,2,F 6,5,NF 2,3,F 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4,5,PF 5,3,PF 2,2,F 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF ￿￿￿￿) 2,2,F 5,4,PF 6,5,NF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 2,3,F 2,2,F 5,4,PF 6,4,PF 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 2,2,F 2,2,F 5,5,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 2,3,F
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 2,3,F 7,5,NF 5,6,PF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,NF 2,3,F 7,5,NF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,NF 1,2,F 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF ￿￿￿￿3)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 1,2,F 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 1,2,F 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 3,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 1,2,F 6,6,NF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 3,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 1,2,F 6,6,NF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 1,2,F ￿￿￿￿3) 5,4,PF 3,3,PF 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,6,PF 1,2,F 3,2,F 5,3,PF 3,3,PF 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6,5,PF 1,1,F 3,3,PF ￿￿￿￿3) 2,3,F 3,3,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 1,1,F 6,4,PF 3,3,PF 2,3,F 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 1,1,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF 6,4,PF 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 1,1,F 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF 2,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5,4,PF 1,2,F 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 3,5,PF 4,4,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿) 1,2,F 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,5,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,2,F 1,2,F 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,2,F 1,2,F 3,3,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,2,F 1,2,F 3,3,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,2,F 1,2,F 3,3,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 4,5,PF
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1,2,F 1,2,F 3,3,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 4,5,PF
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